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Summary
The 1976 Survey of Economic Opportunity, carried out by the Bureau of
the Census, gathered detailed information on the income and use of social
services by over 150,000 families, including about 15,000 immigrant families.
These data serve as the basis for estimates of the effects of an average
immigrant family through the cost of welfare payments and schooling as well
as through the benefits of the taxes paid by immigrants.
From the time of entry until about 12 years later, immigrants use
substantially less public services (largely due to less use of Social
Security because of youth) than do native families. Then immigrant usage
becomes roughly equal to natives. After about 2-6 years immigrant families
come to pay as much in taxes than do native families, and after that they
pay substantially more. And the net balance of these two forces is positive
in every year for natives. That is, immigrants contribute more to the
public coffers than they take from them.
l'BRllHlfU.OFI.ORBm-e!'"'-""?«

"What Immigrants Take From, and Give To, The .Public Coffers"
Julian L. Simon
THE STUDY IN BRIEF
The 1976 Survey of Economic Opportunity, carried out by the Bureau
of the Census gathered detailed information on the income and use of
social services by over 150,000 families, including abut 15,000 Immigrant
families. These data serve as the basis for estimates of the effects
of an average immigrant family in the years after arrival upon the income
of an average native family through the cost of welfare payments and
schooling as well as through the benefits of the taxes paid by immigrants.
The results show that from the time of entry until about 12 years
later, immigrants use substantially less of such public services as wel-
fare and unemployment compensation payments, food stamps, Medicare-
Medicaid, and schooling for children than do native families, largely
due to less use of Social Security because of their youthful age. Later,
immigrant usage becomes roughly equal to that of natives. By the time
the immigrant family retires and collects Social Security, it typically
has raised children who are then contributing taxes to Social Security
and thereby balancing out the parents' receipts, just as with native
families. In this way there is a one-time benefit to natives because
the immigrants arrive without a generation of elderly parents who might
receive Social Security. After about 3-6 years average immigrant families
come to earn as much as average native families and thereby pay as much
in tc:ies than dc native families; and after that they earn and pay sub-
stantially more. The net balance of these two forces—taxes paid and
services received—is positive in every year for natives. That is.
Immigrants contribute more to the public coffers than they take from
them. When looked at as an investment by natives, similar to such
social capital as dams and roads, an immigrant family is an excellent
investment worth somewhere between $15,000 and $20,000, even calculated
with relatively high rates for the social cost of capital. (This is in
1975 dollars, to be compared with mean yearly native family earnings
of about $11,000 in that year.)
Immigrants also seem to have the effect of narrowing the income
distribution of all families, which most people consider "beneficial."
The earning distribution of male immigrant-workers suggests the pos-
sibility that immigrants may compete disproportionately with low-wage
workers for more than a decade after entry; this apparent effect may
be specious, however, explainable by age distribution rather than by
job-market characteristics of immigrants.
The results arrived at here generally square with findings of
previous research. The pattern of immigrants quickly contributing
more in taxes than they receive in services is also found in Israel
and in Canada. And the data on age distribution and the number of
earners square with studies of UK as well as with studies of Israel and
Canada.
WHAT IMMIGRANTS TAKE FROM, AND GIVE TO, THE PUBLIC COFFERS*
Julian L. Simon
I. INTRODUCTION
A rational immigration policy would take into account all the costs
and benefits of immigrants with respect to natives* incomes, employment,
and tax burdens, with their net balance. The main aim of this study is
to estimate the amounts of public services that immigrants use, includ-
ing social security, unemployment compensation, public assistance, food
stamps, and education. Because of the comi>osition of the sample, and
of the questionnaire, it will not cover the special programs that
Indochinese and Russian refugees benefit from now. The unemployment
rates of immigrants at present and in past periods will also be esti-
mated, as another way to estimate the present burden for natives' un-
employment and welfare.
A secondary aim of the study is to estimate the incomes of immi-
grant families, and from these incomes to roughly calculate the taxes
paid by Immigrants. With such data on tax contributions, plus the data
on transfers to the immigrants, it should then be possible to estimate
the net transfers between immigrants and natives, that is, the net ef-
fect of immigrants on natives through the public coffers.
The basic source of data is the 1976 Survey of Income and Education
(SIE), conducted by the Bureau of the Census.
*I greatly appreciate the programming and wise counsel about the
data of Jeremy Atack, and the research assistance of DaNien Tzang.
Rick Sullivan and- David Simon checked the computations. Francine Blau,
Barry Chiswick, Susan Forbes, Rita Simon, and Jeremy Atack gave me very
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Guillermina Jasso and Mark Rosenzweig
discovered that the Survey of Income and Education contained income and
welfare data on a large number of immigrants and thereby made this study
possible.
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The most difficult and challenging part of the work has been—and
continues to be—the decisions about (a) the comparison framework: For
reasons given below, I decided to compare recent entry cohorts and all
natives, without further classification or standardization in the main
runs; (b) the imits to use as basic observations: I decided to comr-
pare all families with a foreign-bom head (but not with just a foreign-
bom spouse or child) to all native families without regard for age or
other criteria, again for reasons given below; Cc) the overall account-
ing framework: I decided to include social-welfare transfers, taxes,
and school expenditures, all reduced to a single dollar-value comparison
with a present-value framework. It is upon these judgments that the
validity of this work stands or falls, and its quality should be judged
upon this and not upon the extent of theoretical and econometric refine-
ments and elaboration, both of which I have tried to reduce to a min-
imum in this report.*
Estimates are developed for all immigrants entering in a given year
in such fashion that the effects of a proportional change in immigration
quotas can be projected. The data for immigrants as an entry cohort yield
information about the "cost" side of admitting a group of immigrants, to
be balanced against the "benefits" of taxes paid and other social contri-
butions by that group. Other economic and non-economic Influences are
very important, too, but are not dealt with in this report.
*The most time-consioming aspect of the work, however, was the cre-
ation of usable computer files, with all the accompanying glitches that
one understands only after having worked with a census-type tape.
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Economlsts who are oriented primarily to explaiiatory analysis may
not at first feel at home with the unconditional-classification analyses
reported below. In my judgment, however, such unconditional comparisons
are the appropriate method for the evaluation of social decisions with
respect to the variables being considered—as, for example, the overall
economic effect of a cohort of immigrants is appropriate for decisions
about the total number of Immigrants to admit.
There has been little systematic work on this general topic. I
have gotten ideas from North and Houston's study of services used by
illegal immigrants (1976), from Jones' and Smith's (1970) study of new
Commonwealth Ismigrants into the UK, and from Israeli and Canadian
panel studies. The results are broadly consistent with these other
studies of immigrants.
The organization of this report is as follows: Section II des-
cribes the sample. Section III estimates the total amounts of public
services used by the average immigrant in various years following his
entry into the U.S. (The term "his" is used for reasons explained
below.) Section IV estimates the taxes paid by Immigrants. Section V
calculates the net-balance effect of immigrants of various cohorts upon
natives. Section VI briefly discusses the effects of immigrants on the
income distribution. Section VII discusses various criteria for admis-
sion in connection with the economic characteristics of various sub-
groups of immigrants. Section VIII concludes and summarizes. The sur-
vey is described in the Appendix, and a questionnaire is duplicated
there. A list of notation and classifications used may also be found
in Appendix A.
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II. THE SAMPLE
The SIE gathered data nationally on 158,500 households, stratified
in such a manner as to include more-than-proportional numbers of house-
holds with children living in poverty. The survey coverage is good,
because only 7,300 households refused interview. All households with
foreign-bom heads constitute the main sample used in this work. A
random subsample of native-American households is used for comparison
purposes drawn from the entire sample less families with immigrant or
Puerto Rican members. The native sample was drawn with four systematic
starts, so that the means of the sub-samples may be compared as a quick
check of sample variability. Persons in private and public institutions
such as nursing homes and hospitals were not included in the SIE survey.
Puerto Ricans are not included in the immigrant group because they
are in no way governed by immigration laws . As a separate group they
may be of interest, but they are not relevant to the social decisions
to which this paper pertains.
It is not known whether any illegals are in the sample of immigrants,
because no question would indicate such status. But given the relatively
small numbers in recent cohorts compared to the total, and given the rela-
tively small number of persons of Mexican and Caribbean origin in the
sample, it is doubtful that illegals could in any case have much of an
effect in the overall resvilts. Similarly, there is no question that in-
dicates whether a person is an "economic" immigrant, a "family comple-
tion" immigrant, or a refugee. But one may presume that many of the
Cubans, and many of the Russians and Poles who entered subsequent to
1965 or 1970, are refugees.
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The primary unit of analysis in this study is the male immigrant
together with the family he brings or acquires. This means that fami-
lies with female immigrants married to male natives are excluded from
the main analyses. The logic is as follows: Imagine a male immigrant
who marries a female immigrant and has children. It is reasonable to
view the effects of the couple plus their children as the full effects
of the male's and female's immigration. Now imagine that the same male
and female had instead married natives who would otherwise have married
each other, and that both families are now counted in the immigrant
sample. Though there is no more total effect on natives' income than
before, on average, the results would show twice as much effect. Hence
this would be double-counting. We can get rid of most of the misleading
double-counting by counting only male-immigrant-head households.* (Be-
cause the numbers of male and female immigrants are not the same—the
number of female immigrants in the chlldbearlng ages, all in all, is
somewhat greater than the number of males—the procedure is not perfect.
But the numbers are close enough for most practical purposes.)
The family rather than the household or the individual seems the
appropriate unit of analysis. One important reason for not focussing
on individuals is that it Is on the basis of family needs that public
*Comparlsons have been made of married-couple families with (a) only
the male an immigrant, and (b) only the female an immigrant, to see
whether including only the males introduces bias. Direct comparisons
holding entry-date and/or age of immigrants are inappropriate because
the female immigrant's husband is, on average, several years older than
the male immigrant. With this in mind, the comparisons do not indicate
any major difference. Perhaps more convincing, adding the families
with the female immigrant only to the general sample does not much
affect the results.
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welfare, ADC, and similar transfers are received; another reason is that
children are attached to both parents where present, rather than to just
one of them. Furthermore, the earnings of the varioxis members tend to
be pooled by the family as well as for assessment of income taxes. The
household (though in most cases it is identical to the family) is not
such a long-lasting unit with respect to other non-related earners, nor
is income so likely to be pooled within it, or transfers to be based
upon it. In some analyses, however, we shall work with the earnings
of the head, and in later work with the earnings of the spouse.
Associated with this reasoning is the decision to consider single
immigrant women as a unit of analysis, but not married immigrant women.
A woman who immigrates single and then marries an immigrant disappears
as an independent economic entity, and her impact is then through the
family unit. For a single woman, the opposite is the case, and hence
for unmarried adults, both males and females are included as separate
families, without danger of double-counting.
The status of persons bom abroad who spend some or much of their
pre-adult years in the U.S. poses interesting questions. The most Im-
portant issue concerns whether these persons and their families should
be included in overall calculations for the immigrant family population.
On the one hand, these persons are the direct consequence of social
policies to admit immigrants; on the other hand, these persons are not
likely to show the effects of immigration. Luckily for the clarity of
our analysis, however, practically none of these persons appear in the
cohort samples for the first ten years or so after entry, because there
is not sufficient time to become heads of families, and these are the
-7-
cohorts that dominate any present-value calculations of the impact of
immigrants. For older cohorts, I have made runs both with and without
these persons, using various age brackets, to see how the results are
affected, and have concluded that the distinction may be disregarded
for this report.
In some analyses of earnings the sample includes only the males,
as noted in those analyses.
III. PUBLIC SERVICES USED BY IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES
The aim of this section is to estimate the overall gross cost to
U.S. citizens of admitting an average immigrant to the U.S. (Gross
benefits and net effects are discussed in subsequent sections.) More
specifically, we wish to estimate for the average iimnigrant in an entry
cohort (a) the amount of each service used for each year after entry,
and (b) the yearly total.
The estimate for immigrants as an entire cohort is the most impor-
tant for our purposes, because it is relevant to policy decisions about
the total number of immigrants to allow in; it tells the gross cost to
natives of the average immigrant family. (It may also be useful to know
the quantities of services used by the various ethnic groups, and the
various occupational groups. There is some "danger" in doing this, in
that the results may be used against one or another group in an unfairly
discriminatory manner. In the judgment of many other people, such risks
should not be allowed to suppress otherwise interesting results; I myself
would prefer not to make these analyses at all. Nevertheless, such es-
timates are offered in brief in Section VII,)
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Table 1 shows the amounts of varioxis types of payments received by
persons who have been in the U.S. varying lengths of time. Colimms 1-8
show the various transfer payments to entry cohorts and to natives. For
example, for all immigrants who arrived in 1974 (leaving aside the female
immigrants who married native males), the average unemployment compensa-
tion received in 1975 was $204. Another example: For the cohort who
arrived in 1975, average public welfare compensation received was $76,
but because the 1975 immigrants arrived after the start of the year,
this number does not represent a full year in the country; nor can we
assume half a year's experience, because (as we shcJ.1 see later) the
cohort's reported earnings are more than might be expected from a half
year's residence in the U.S. (perhaps because they reflect earnings
abroad)
.
Table 1
The results for natives are shown in lines 10-14. (The total sam-
ple for natives in line 10, the four sub-samples in lines 11-14; com-
parison of the mean values for the four sub-samples affords a quick check
on variability) . The results for families that arrived in 1976 are shown
in line 15; the meaning of these numbers is exceedingly unclear, because
the data supposedly refers to the calendar year 1975.* And the cohorts
*Mr. George Gray of the Census Bureau, who was in charge of the
SIE Survey, said that there is no obvious explanation for the reporting
of 1975 earnings and services used by the cohort who entered in 1976.
The earnings could be earnings abroad, but the services could not be
so explained. The likeliest explanation in his view is confusion on
the part of the interviewers. The interviewers were not instructed
specifically on this matter.
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that arrived in 1949 or before are shown below for completeness, though
they are not relevant to policy decisions concerning immigration for the
twin reasons disctissed at greater length earlier: (a) At even a very
low discount rate, the magnitudes related to persons who arrived a quar-
ter of a century earlier do not weigh heavily in a present-value computa-
tion, (b) More important, the older Immigrants must now be seen as part
of an equilibrium system. Their children, and the economic impacts of
those children, are an important part of the total effects of this co-
hort, but data on their children is not available; for the same reason,
the 1950-1959 cohort should not be considered an important part of the
sample.
Point (b) above requires amplification because the mechanism is
not iomediately obvious. To start, we must be clear that we are inter-
ested here in the resource flows due to immigrants that affect the
economic position of natives taken as a group. That is, we want to
compare the consumption of natives (including consumption of services)
in two hypothetical situations, with and without a group of natives.
We are not interested here in legal obligations, entitlements, equity,
or the consumption of immigrants.
A simplified model may help. Consider a conmunity of subsistence
farmers where there is a surplus of land, and each farm produces the
same output. Each family consists of a married couple, two children,
and two retired adults. Children do not work until age 20, at which
time they marry, have two children, and work for 20 years. At age forty
the couple retires and lives until age sixty. On each farm, then, there
are always one working couple, two child dependents and two aged depen-
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dents, a stationary demographic system. The farm produces no surplus
or saving; all production is consumed.
Consider, now, a newly married couple who move into the community.
For 20 years, their production need support only the couple and their
children leaving a surplus which the community can tax part of. During
this period the "immigrant" family is an economic benefit to the native.
After 20 years, when the immigrant couple retire, the family has the
same characteristics as an "equilibrium" native family, and the retire-
ment consumption of the "immigrant" couple is paid for by their children.
This illustrates how there is a one-time benefit to natives during the
first years that an immigrant couple is in the conmunity, and that there
is no reverse flow from their own "social security payment" after they
retire. And the nature of the obligation between the immigrant couple
and their children (which leads their children to support them) has no
bearing upon the consumption of natives.
In column 9 we read the totals for the five most important cate-
gories of welfare payment transfers aside from social security. We see
that the average family in each of the cohorts of immigrants since 1950-
1959 uses about the same or slightly more such services than do native
families—ranging from $137 less to $148 more. But when Social Security*
is included, we see in column 10 that immigrants received much less such
welfare pa3ments in total than do natives—ranging from $294 less to
$823 less. Given the consistency from cohort to cohort, there is no
*The fact that Social Security is "earned" is not relevant in this
context. Whether a payment is "earned" or is "charity" refers to the
legal and ethical obligations between persons. Our focus here is only
on whether certain flows do or do not take place.
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question of the statistical significance of the smaller use by iannigrants
than natives. The main economic significance is that the immigrants do
not use higher amovints of services, as is frequently alleged.
Education is an important public service used by immigrant fam^
ilies. The SIE survey does not show the total number of children in
the family, but it does show the number living at home. This latter
number should not be a bad approximation for young families and for
children aged ^17. (For more mature families, one could use Census
data, and perhaps Bean's work on the Census tape to be reported to the
Select Commission.) Colrnim 11 shows the average number of children per
family between the ages 3 and 17 inclusive. Immigrant families resid-
ing in the U.S. more than five years have more children in that age
bracket than do native families on the average (due to age composition
rather than fertility differences, of course). I multiplied these maa-
bers by the 1975-76 average annual expenditure* per student in public
elementary and secondary schools of $1,302 (daily membership, implicitly
assuming that private schools are an insignificant factor); the results
are also shown in column 11. In this category. Immigrants use substan-
tially more services than do natives after a few years—$A76 more per
family for the 1960-64 and 1950-59 cohorts than for natives.
Next, we consider Medicare and Medicaid.** Column 7 and 8 show the
proportions of the various groups that use these services. The average
*USHEW, Statistics of Public Elementary and Secondary Day Schools ,
Fall 1975, Table 2.
*DEEW Publication No. (SRS) 76-03150, NCSS Report B-1 (12/75),
Medical Assistance (Medicaid) Finances Under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act , December, 1975.
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cost per user of Medicare was $592 in 1975, and for Medicaid it was $126.
(The average cost per person over 65 was $205 for Medicaid, and a con-
siderably large proportion of natives than of recent immigrant cohorts
are over 65, but I shall not bother to make an adjustment for this).
Another relevant matter is the distribution of persons in the in-
stitutional poptilation among natives and within the various immigrant
units. These persons are not included in the SIE sample. We can be
sure, however, that institutionalized persons are found in larger pro-
portions among natives because the elderly constitute a large part of
this sub-population. For example, of the 2,132,621 total inmates of
institutions in 1970, the distributions by age (together with total U.S.
population) were: under 25 years, 447,530 (93,314,000, for .47%);
25-44,' 349,423 (47,979,000, for .73%); 45-64, 364,022 (41.818,000, for
.87%); 65 and over, 971,646 (20,102,000, for 4.8%).* And the annual
expenditures per inmate are high
—
perhaps $6,000-$7,000 in 1976.**
However, a substantial proportion of these persons are in private insti-
tutions, and the breakdown by natives and by immigrants of various cohorts
has not been published (though the breakdown by age for immigrants and
natives is available). Given that less than one percent of the popula-
tion is in institutions, implying an average expenditure of perhaps
$60 per person in total and less for public expenditures, the matter
may safely be neglected.
*U.S. Bureau of the Census, Subject Report PC(2)-4E, Persons in
Institutions and Other Group Quarters , July, 1973, p. 26.
**For example, $6,647 for correctional institutions in 1970, $5,541
for mental institutions in 1970, and $5,016 for chronic disease nursing
homes in 1967.
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Special assistance to refugees—which in 1980 amounts to $1,000
per person in cash to the assisting refugee organization plus some over-
head, and also some special programs—also has not been included in the
analysis, because there is no way of knowing which families in our sample
came as refugees. Aggregated statistics, however, show that refugees
have always been a small enough fraction of total immigrants so that the
present-value calculations would not be much affected by an allowance
for this cost. This effect and the institutional population effect work
in offsetting directions.
Now we are in a position to estimate the average services used by
the variovis groups. This total is shown in colimm 12. There we see
that the very recent cohorts use much less services than do natives—
for example, $971 less per family for the 1973-1974 cohorts considered
together than for natives. The amounts of services used by older cohorts
are higher; they move upward and reach equality with natives some 10-15
years after arrival.
Figiire 1 plots the data in column 12, Table 1. A freehand curve
allows us to calculate the change in services used with an additional
year in the United States. One may also estimate this relationship in a
more formal fashion, but I shall not bother to fit various functions now.
Figure 1
IV. TAXES PAID BY IMMIGRANTS
To avoid confusion, it is crucial not to compare the data on earn-
ing patterns in this report with earning patterns discxissed by Chiswick
(1978), Blau (1980), and others. Their aim is to compare natives to
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immigrants with as many factors other than immigrant-native differences
held constant, in order to understand the nature of the immigrant-native
difference; by contrast in this report, nothing is held constant other
than year of entry, because—as mentioned earlier—the aim here is to
assess the unconditional impact of that cohort on the natives' standard
of living. And North's data (1979, p. 75) for the first six years in
the country, based on Social Security data, refer to earnings of adult
males rather than to family earnings. Yet the broad patterns of the
family results clearly are compatible with the other studies.
Column 4 in Table 2 shows that somewhere between 2-6 years after
entry, the average immigrant family comes to earn about as much as the
average native family, and after that earns more, (This finding is
based on the averages for the 1970-1973 cohorts.) This rapid approach to
equality is heavily influenced, of course, by age and education composition,
and especially the absence of retired family heads among the immigrants.
Table 2 ^^i F i;u^ i-
Inferences from earnings data about taxes paid by various cohorts
of immigrants, and by the representative native family, are tenuous
though crucial, A key difficulty is that different proportions of over-
all taxes (not just income taxes) are paid by persons of different in-
come levels (Browning and Johnson, 1979), which means that a proper cal-
culation must be based upon the entire income distribution of a cohort
of people, rather than just the mean. The distribution can be partially
estimated from these data, and I shall do so in Section VI, but unfortu-
nately the raw data on the original data are top-coded to "?50,000 or
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more" for individuals and $75,000 or more for families despite that the
raw data included actual figures for the highest-income families (top-
coding here is intended to avoid disclosure; it was also done for data
on assets such as value of home, and liquid assets). Therefore, it is
conceivable that two groups with the same calculated mean income from
our data would actually pay different amounts of taxes because (a) dis-
tributions of families with the same mean income can pay different
amounts of taxes, and (b) due to top-coding, the actual means can be
different though the calculated means are the same.
A bit of light is thrown on the matter by the variance of the in-
come distributions in our data. The distributions show somewhat smaller
standard deviations relative to mean income for immigrants than for na-
tives, as seen in Table 2. This probably means that, for the same mean
income, a group of immigrants pays somewhat less taxes than a group of
natives due to fewer very high incomes. Nevertheless, we are not likely
to go far wrong by assuming that taxes paid are proportional to mean in-
come.
The total of taxes paid—found in column 11 of Table 2—is the total
receipts of the state, local and federal governments
—$771.9 billion in
1979, which we may approximate as 32.6% of gross national product
($2,368.5 billion; Economic Report of the President , 1980, pp. 288, 203).
The taxes paid by the median-income person are 85% of the taxes paid by
the mean-taxes-paid taxpayer; that is, the rate at which taxes are paid
by the person between the fifth and sixth deciles of income recipients
—
24.8% of income paid in taxes—is 85% of the mean 29.1% for all taxable
incoioes (Browning and Johnson p . 51) . So even if immigrants are more
concentrated near the mean than are natives, the effect will not be large.
-16-
In brief, though our estimate of taxes paid by Immigrants and cit-
izens is rough, the inaccuracy is unlikely to be important in this con-
text because the incomes, and hence the taxes paid by the various cohorts
and natives, are not very different from each other.
Table 3 consolidates the relevant data. Columns 2 and 3 show the
total transfer payments and services used by immigrants in various years
after entry (actually, by various entry cohorts during 1975), and by
natives. Column 4 shows the differences between columns 2 and 3. On
the assumption that the average family just pays for the average family's
services used—an assumption that says no more than that government re-
ceipts equal the sum of government expenditures for various purposes-
then column A indicates the net balance of Immigrants with respect, to
services alone. That is, this is the amount of services more or less
than an average taxpayer* pays for that an immigrant uses.
Table 3
On the tax side now, we first deal with government expenditures
that are invariant to the number of people, or that at least are pure
public goods in the sense that the service they render to any person
are independent of the service others obtain from them. The government
expenditures that seem clearly to fit into this category are national
defense (?85,552 million in 1975), international affairs ($6,922 million),
and general science, space, and technology ($3,989 million), out of total
*The average immigrant may here be considered like the average
taxpayer subject to adjustments to come.
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outlays of $326,185 million, or ($96,463/$326,185 =) 29.6% (p. 284,
Economic Report of the President , 1980) . Federal government expendi-
tures were (§356.8 ^ $532.8 =) 67% of total government expenditures
(p. 288), so the public goods categories are (67% x 29.6% =) 20% of all
taxes. Hence 20% of taxes paid by immigrants are shown in column 7.
Next come other taxes. The differences between the amounts of taxes
paid for non-public-good services by immigrants and by natives are shown
in column 8 of Table 3. To the extent that immigrants pay less or more
than natives, immigrants are taking from, or giving to, natives through
the public coffers, in excess of the services they use.
We may summarize the logic of the tax calculation as follows:
Benefit to natives = (taxpaid services used by average native
less taxpaid serviced used by average Immigrant) + (20% of taxes
paid by immigrant as contribution to expenditures on public goods)
+ (80% of the difference between taxes paid by the average native
family and the average Immigrant family, a quantity which is
negative in some cases).
A calculation is also shown in column 11 of Table 3 for the less
realistic but more "conservative" assumption that there is no public
goods element in immigrants' taxes that immediately lowers the tax bur-
den of natives (or increases benefits from the tax-paid services).
V. THE NET EFFECT OF IMMIGRANTS UPON NATIVES
Now we are in position to sum the effects on a year-by-year basis.
This summary is shown in column 10 of Table 3. There we see that in
every year after entry (until they themselves retire, at which time their
own children are supporting them through the Social Security and Medicare
-18-
system) immigrants benefit natives through the public coffers. And a
calculation of the net present value of the stream of differences shows
that immigrants are a remarkably good investment at any conceivable rate
of discount. At a 3% discount rate, each immigrant family was worth
about §20,600 to natives around 1975, to be compared with the mean yearly
native family earnings of $11,037; at 6% the present value would be
about §15,800 and at 9% it would be about $12,400.
These calculations, however, are partial because they omit both the
capital-dilution effect (negative with respect to natives) and the pro-
ductivity effect (positive with respect to natives). Estimation of these
effects requires a macroeconomic model, plus some key parameter estimates
such as the proportion of the returns to existing capital that are cap-
tured by immigrants. But based on a model discussed elsewhere (Simon,
forthcoming in Chiswick) , together with the transfers estimated here,
one may conclude that the average immigrant is an excellent investment
for taxpayers on almost any reasonable set of parameter estimates.
The obvious implication of these calculations is that, in the num-
bers in which they are now admitted, imml grants have a positive effect
on natives' incomes. The question may be raised, however, about how the
calculations would be affected if the flow of immigrants would be greatly
increased or decreased, that is whether the effect of an additional im-
migrant depends on the scale of immigration. Scale effects are embodied
in the full model through the Maithusian diminishing-returns mechanism
in the production function. This mechanism operates across the board
at any scale of Immigration. There is no obvious reason to believe that,
with respect to production capital, the negative Malthusian effect is
-19-
greater at one scale or another. There are possible infrastructure con-
gestion and economies-of-scale effects, of course, but this is much too
wide a subject to be discussed here. This topic as a whole goes far
beyond the boundaries of my assigned topic, and in fact far beyond any
knowledge that is currently available.
VI. THE EFFECT UPON INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Two important side issues upon which these data throw some light
are (a) the effect on the overall income distribution, and (b) the ef-
fect upon the poorest segment of the native population.
Concerning the overall earnings distribution, we may first consider
the standard deviation as a measure of distribution, and we see in
Table 2 that it is smaller relative to mean income—as well as absolutely
smaller, on the average—for immigrant families in t;he various cohorts
than for natives.
A more explicit and intuitive approach is to examine the proportions
of families in the various age brackets. Table 4 such shows data from
the 1970 Census. The 1965-1970 cohort shows a larger proportion of immi-
grants than natives in the lowest age brackets, but this figure is con-
fused by the fact that the income data were for 1969, before the 1969
and 1970 portions of the 1965-1970 cohort were in the U.S. for a full
year of work. The 1960-64 cohort already has a substantially lower pro-
portion of families with the lowest incomes than do natives. In the SIE
sample, too, we see in Table 5 that starting with the second year after
entry (the 1974 cohort in 1975), there are fewer immigrant families in
the lowest income categories than among natives, and this continues true
up to the oldest inmiigrants , And for the first eleven years after entry
-20-
the proportion of immigrants in the highest income brackets is lower than
for natives. Including income from assets for both natives and immi-
grants would surely intensify this pattern. We can therefore say that
for at least the first decade after entry, immigrants reduce the family
income distribution at both the high and low ends. (These measures are
likely to be quite misleading from a welfare-judgment point of view, of
course, because of the very different age and size compositions of the
native sample and the various iranigrant cohorts. One could attempt to
control for such variables, but that will constitute a major investiga-
tion in itself.)
Tables 4 and 5
In order to estimate the effects of immigrants on the various earn-
ings classes in the labor market we must consider, not the entire group
of immigrant families in each cohort compared to all native families,
but rather participants in the same general labor market. Therefore
we examine the distribution of earnings by the male heads of families,
aged 24-64, in the various immigrant cohorts and among natives,* as
seen in Table 6, There we see that immigrants come to have a smaller
proportion of men in the lowest earnings bracket than do natives after
10-15 years. Until that time immigrants may have a negative effect upon
the lowest-earning groups. It may also be, however, that the observed
effect is due to the youthful composition of new immigrant cohorts, and
*The 24-64 break rather than the more common 25-64 break was simply
for convenience.
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that if we were to hold age composition constant, the effect would dis-
appear. Unfortunately, the numbers of persons of various ages in the
various immigrant cohorts are sufficiently small that a refined analysis
is necessary to answer the question,*
Table 6
In assessing the findings in this section, the reader may wish to
keep in Tn^nri that the ethnic composition of immigrants has been changing
over the years, and especially since 1965. The earlier-entering cohorts
were much more heavily European than were the latest-entering cohorts,
and there probably were changes in mean education levels as well (per-
haps increases in the proportion of both low and high educational levels,
with a decrease in the middle, as North [1979] suggests
.J
This limits our
capacity to extrapolate from past experience to the future. For any
specified distribution of characteristics of an entry cohort, however,
the data for the past cohorts could be made to yield more comparable
estimates. The next section bears tangentially on this matter.
Finally, if immigrants are of a skill mix similar to natives, or
have fewer persons in low-skill categories, low-income natives should
not suffer injury in the labor market except in the shortest run, be-
cause the increased demand caused by the immigrants would thus lead to
as many new jobs as the immigrants fill.
*Jeremy Atack and I intend to pursue this line of work in the next
year.
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VII, SPECIAL CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION
The calculations and discussions offered until now apply to the
broadest sort of social decision concerning immigrants, to vd.t, how many
to admit. But policy decisions may be taken, not only about the total
number of immigrants, but also about the characteristics of immigrants
who will, and who will not, be given immigrant visas. If so, the issue
will certainly be debated in terms of the economic impact of various sub-
groups of potential immigrants. To put it another way: What sort of
characteristics are associated with high economic performance?
We do not need refined analysis to tell us that young immigrants
with high education are the most desirable economically. Education
leads to a high level of taxes paid due to high earnings, as well as
to low usage of social services. The extent of the effect is revealed
by regressions holding constant such variables as age and entry date.
Appendix B shows the results of several such regressions. (The dummy
variable technique is used for education, age, and time in the United
States, rather than continuous linear or non-linear specifications, be-
cause I did not enter into an extensive investigation of the appropriate
functional forms, and I did not wish to run the risk of mis-specification
by Imposing one or another form in the absence of such an investigation.
If one wishes, the dummy-variable regressions shown here may be viewed
as a preliminary step in deciding how the regressions might best be
specified continuously.) The results for the effect of education on
male-head earnings seem generally to jibe with Chiswick's results for
the 1970 Census using regressions specified in somewhat different
fashion.
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Also shown in Appendix B are regressions of the receipt of transfer
payments other than Social Security upon education and various other
variables, A high level of education seems to be associated with lower
use of such services, but the highest amount of services used are by
the 9-11 years-of-school group—about $450 more than 19+ years of school-
ing, in all the cohorts—and the amount is gradually less with fewer
years of schooling—down to around $300 more than the 19+ group for the
1-4 years group.
As to age: Ceteris paribus, the younger is an immigrant, the more
years will the immigrant be a net contributor to native's incomes via
transfer payments before he or she retires (at which time, however, the
immigrant's children are effectively "supporting" him or her and making
the net balance zero). That is, the younger the immigrant, the more
years the "investment asset" yields a return. Furthermore, younger
immigrants are less likely to have children in school or even bom, and
hence the net balance with natives is even more positive. But in any
given year the 35-39 age group get less services than any other age
group.
As the ethnicity: This is a very complex topic. The work is still
too incomplete to report, especially in light of the possible repercus-
sions of an incorrect assessment. For example, the preliminary data
suggest that the earnings pattern for Russian-Polish immigrants may be
quite different in the 1970-1975 cohorts than in earlier cohorts, an
effect which might be masked in a regression that lumps all cohorts to-
gether. And one can obtain entirely different results for an ethnic
group depending on whether age and schooling and ability with English
-24-
are, or are not, held constant; both ways of looking at country of ori-
gin could be appropriate for various purposes. Hence the results of
this work will be reported later. In any case, I doubt that anyone
would wish to make any policy decisions based on these results. In
light of our basic social value of avoiding ethnic discrimination
wherever possible, discrimination by education and perhaps age would
seem to be vastly preferable, as well as more effective.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From the time of entry until about 12 years later, immigrants use
substantially less public services (largely due to less use of Social
Security because of youth) than do native families. Then immigrant
usage becomes roughly equal to natives. After about 2-6 years Immigrant
families come to pay as much in taxes than do native families, and after
that they pay substantially more. And the net balance of these two
forces is positive in every year for natives. That is, immigrants con-
tribute more to the public coffers than they take from them.
Immigrants also seem to have the "beneficial" effect of narrow-
ing the income distribution of all families. The earning distribution
of male immigrant-workers suggests the possibility that immigrants may
compete disproportionately with low-wage workers for more than a decade
after entry; this apparent effect may be specious, however, explainable
by age distribution rather than by the job-market characteristics of
immigrants
.
The results arrived at here generally square with findings of pre-
vious research. The pattern of immigrants quickly contributing more in
taxes than they receive in services is also fovind in Israel and in
Canada, And the data on age distribution and the number of earners
square with the UK data as well as with Israel and Canada.
-26-
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